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2015 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM: RISKY BUSINESS: THE 
ART OF REDUCING LITIGATION UNCERTAINTY 
AND SETTLING CASES 
Kenneth R. Feinberg* 
 
Now, this is a topic worthy of a symposium. In the work I do, there 
is a great deal of discussion about how the 9/11 fund, the GM 
ignition switch fund, and the BP oil spill fund promote speed and 
efficiency in establishing compensation schemes outside of the 
traditional litigation system. 1 Very few commentators, very few 
critics, very few lawyers or public policy experts focus on what I 
think is extremely important to claimants who file a claim: the 
certainty of compensation. When you file a lawsuit, you roll the dice. 
You roll the dice in terms of outcome. You roll the dice in terms of 
time. You roll the dice in terms of cost. But most of all, you roll the 
dice in terms of uncertainty. You have heard it a million times. 
Lawyers will tell clients nothing is certain. Yes, we may tell a client 
that there is a ninety percent chance of success. But, nothing in the 
civil litigation system is certain. And today, this program focuses on 
prediction and minimizing risk. Very important. 
One of the great advantages of what I do is that a policy maker or 
the Congress sets up, by statute, an alternative to the civil justice 
system. For example, Congress established the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund thirteen days after 9/11. Anybody who 
lost a loved one—on the planes, at the World Trade Center, at the 
Pentagon—anybody who was physically injured was given a choice: 
sue the World Trade Center, the government, the airlines, the Port 
                                                                                                                 
 *  This transcript is a reproduction of the Keynote Presentation lead by Kenneth R. Feinberg at the 
2015 Georgia State University Law Review Symposium, February 27, 2015, The Carter Center, Atlanta, 
Georgia.  
 1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 
(2001); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (E.D. La. 2012); GEN. MOTORS, GM Ignition Compensation Claims 
Resolution Facility FINAL PROTOCOL for Compensation of Certain Death and Physical Injury Claims 
Pertaining to the GM Ignition Switch Recall, http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/
FINAL%20PROTOCOL%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf (last visited March 18, 2015). 
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Authority, the security guard companies or, at your option, come into 
a no-fault workers’ compensation-type fund. File your claim and 
within sixty days you will be compensated if you are eligible. And 
there’s the amount. If you do not like the amount, opt out. Go sue. 
But if you like the amount, or if you are satisfied with the amount, or 
if you accept the amount, release your lawsuit completely. No 
lawsuit, here is the money. Taxpayer money! Well, ninety-seven 
percent of all death claimants took the money. Certainty. “Mr. 
Feinberg, I lost my son on the airplane.” Certainty. Liability is not an 
issue. The only issue: how much money you are going to receive? 
“Mr. Feinberg, as a result of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by 
BP, I could not fish and I lost a $100,000.” Submit your claim. 
Certainty. No finger pointing as to liability. BP has agreed with the 
President to front $20 billion to pay the claim. No risk. In sixty days 
you will know whether you are eligible and how much money you 
are going to receive. That is not risk. That is an insurance policy. If 
you do not like it then go litigate. But if you like it sign “I will not 
sue.” Well, in sixteen months, $6.5 billion went out and 222,000 
individuals and businesses released their claims. 
Nine months ago, GM ignition switch failure was alleged in 
certain GM automobiles: Cobalts, Ions, Saturns, et cetera. Congress 
said, “We and GM have decided we will minimize risk. We will set 
up a no-fault compensation scheme independently designed and 
administered by Mr. Feinberg. And in that scheme, if you lost a loved 
one or were physically injured in an accident in one of these 
automobiles, Mr. Feinberg will evaluate your claim.” GM’s liability? 
Irrelevant. Contributory negligence of the driver—speeding, texting, 
drinking—irrelevant. The bankruptcy bar imposed by the bankruptcy 
court following GM’s bankruptcy? Irrelevant. File your claim and if 
you are eligible—if you can demonstrate that the switch was the 
proximate cause of the accident, without regard to contributory 
negligence or GM’s liability—you will receive compensation within 
sixty days. Minimum risk. And if you do not get the result you want, 
either in terms of eligibility or amount, go file a lawsuit. 
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Programs like I have been asked to design and administer try and 
minimize the amount of “risky business.” Now, when policy makers 
set up these programs, they are not really thinking about Georgia 
State’s symposium and “risky business.” What they are thinking 
about is the other two pillars of what I do—speed and efficiency. 
They are focused on setting up a compensation system that is 
voluntary. No one has to participate. Rather, setting up a system that 
people will know quickly how much money they are going to 
receive. And they will know this without the necessity of all of this 
litigation cost. And that is why in 9/11, in BP, in GM, virtually 
everybody comes into the program. It may be voluntary. Why not? 
Why not come into this program? Why not get a free preview of what 
you will receive for one of these Feinberg-administered programs? If 
you do not like it, do not take it. 
Everybody takes it, virtually. The money is very, very generous. 
Because, do not forget, you are trying to voluntarily entice people to 
enter into these programs. There is no mandate. You have to 
convince them. Forgo a suit; take the compensation. Well, in order to 
do that you have to have a pretty generous fund. You better have the 
money. You better have the wherewithal to set up a program like this. 
The average award for a death claim in the 9/11 fund was a little over 
$2 million tax-free. The average award for a physical injury claim in 
the 9/11 fund, a little over $400,000. Ninety-seven percent accepted 
the money. 
The other ninety-four people opted out and sued. They all settled 
their cases five years later. Some may have received a little more. 
Some may have received a little less. Five years of waiting and you 
have to pay your lawyer twenty-five percent. BP, ninety-two percent 
of the fishermen, oyster harvesters, ship boat captains, and hotels 
accepted the money. In sixteen months, $6.5 billion paid out. Very 
little “risky business.” 
And now GM. Well, GM is ongoing. You cannot file a claim any 
longer. The deadline was January 31st, 2015. Almost 4,500 claims. 
We have paid so far I think fifty-eight deaths attributable to the 
switch and maybe another 125 or 135 physical injuries. How many 
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people have opted out of the program once they know how much 
they were going to get? None. No one has opted out. Why would 
they? Why would they opt out? You are going to go sue? That is 
“risky business.” 
First of all, the automobile accidents occurred years ago. If you 
can get around the statute of limitations and the GM bankruptcy bar, 
you have a chance. But the accidents occurred a long time ago. You 
know most—not all—most of the drivers were young drivers and 
most were drunk, speeding, fell asleep at the wheel, texting. So you 
confront a contributory negligence barrier that does not exist in my 
program. We are not interested in any of that. We are interested in 
what the police reports say, what the maintenance records show, what 
the photographs of the accident show in demonstrating proximate 
cause. Just like it is a first-year tort law school exam. 
So these programs minimize risk and promote certainty. They do 
an end run around the subject matter of uncertainty. Now, if they do 
an end run around litigation uncertainty by minimizing risk and 
promoting certainty, why is there not more of this? Why do 
companies and public policy makers—judges, Congress, governors, 
mayors—not provide more of these alternatives to the traditional 
conventional civil justice system? Well, there are some real 
downsides to these programs. I must say, as somebody who for the 
last thirty years has been involved in designing and administering 
these programs, and not just these three—Boston Marathon; Virginia 
Tech; Indiana State Fair; Aurora, Colorado; Newtown, 
Connecticut—I have done a dozen of them. Now why do we not see 
more of this? What are the public policy downsides? You have seen 
it is not uncertainty. We are promoting certainty, efficiency, cost 
effectiveness, and speed with these programs. So what is wrong with 
these programs? Well there is a great deal wrong with them. A great 
deal. 
First, they single out for very special, certain treatment, only a 
certain eligible group. Bad things happen to good people every day in 
this country, and you do not have a 9/11 fund or a BP oil spill fund. 
Instead, policymakers say, “If you lost a loved one on 9/11 we are 
4
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going to give you money, certainty, and speed. Everybody else, fend 
for yourself.” Well that is not America you see. That is not America. 
That is elitism. That is the favored few. You should have read some 
of the emails I received during my administration of the 9/11 fund. 
“Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in Oklahoma City. Where is my 
check?” “Dear Mr. Feinberg, I do not get it. My daughter died in the 
basement of the World Trade Center in the original 1993 attacks 
committed by the very same type of people. Where is my check?” 
And it was not just terrorism. “Dear Mr. Feinberg, last year my wife 
saved three little girls from drowning in the Mississippi River, and 
then she drowned a heroine. Where is my check?” 
You better be careful when you take taxpayer money and set up a 
program for certain innocent victims. Everybody else, sorry, you go 
the traditional route. That is why the 9/11 fund is a derelict on the 
waters of the law. It stands alone. It will never be repeated. I think to 
use taxpayer money to pay just some victims but not others is highly, 
highly unlikely. Now, what do I think about the 9/11 fund? Great, 
absolutely the right thing to do at the time. Exhibiting the best of our 
American heritage, our character. From the perspective of the 
American people, we will show the world we take care of our own. A 
wonderful program. But do not ever do it again. Not that way. So that 
is one problem. There is a political, philosophic problem with 
creating special funds for special people and only those people. 
Then there is a second problem. You promote certainty and 
minimize risk by setting up these funds. And how do you do that? By 
delegating unfettered discretion to one person. “Well, one way we 
can promote certainty: let Feinberg do it with no appeals, no 
committees, no checks and balances. Delegation run riot. Let him do 
it. It will work.” Well it better work because there is no real due 
process here in the sense of others promoting uncertainty by 
providing appellate review, checks and balances, access to the courts, 
access to a committee to review Feinberg’s determinations. No! We 
do not want “risky business,” so delegate everything to Feinberg. The 
lawyers howl about this, some of them. Some lawyers—trained at 
Georgia State and elsewhere about the litigation system, the 
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adversary system, due process, the civil justice system—some 
lawyers howl when they see this. But some lawyers are constructive 
critics exclaiming that all of this delegation to one person is not law. 
They believe that these systems do not provide due process, and that 
they are riding roughshod over due process in the interest of 
promoting certainty. 
Now, critics of these lawyers say “Sure, it is their fees that are at 
stake.” I do not buy that. There may be some of that. Every case I 
settle and get a release is one less lawsuit at forty, thirty, or twenty 
percent for a fee. So there is some self-interest or self-motivation. 
But I must say lawyers who have been trained in our litigation civil 
justice system believe the way to achieve justice is to hire a lawyer, 
and the judge and jury will decide. I must say when those lawyers 
stand up and criticize what I do, many of them do so in good faith, 
and I can understand that concern. That is a second reason why these 
programs are relative aberrations. 
I am asked all the time, “Mr. Feinberg, will you speak about your 
GM, BP, 9/11 funds, as the wave of the future.” They are the wave of 
nothing. They are aberrations. Maybe you will see another BP type 
program, but that will require a company to front $20 billion before 
there is even a finding of liability. But it takes a rare situation. 
Unprecedented, to come up with that type of money to resolve claims 
quickly, efficiently, with certainty. 
Now remember we are not only talking about certainty from the 
perspective of the victim. We are also talking about company 
certainty. Companies want certainty. So certainty, avoiding “risky 
business,” you have to look at that from the perspective today of both 
claimant and company—or defendant or government—because 
everybody involved in the civil justice system wants certainty. BP 
made it very clear. Its stock price reflected it. Its public comments 
reflected it. Its business plan reflected it. BP: “President Obama, 
what we are worried about after the BP oil spill is uncertainty. We do 
not want Exxon-Valdez2 for the next twenty-two years and counting. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Mr. Feinberg is referring to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill that resulted in 11 million gallons of oil 
polluting Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th 
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We want certainty. Our stock price wants certainty. Our shareholders 
want certainty. Our board wants certainty. We will set up this 
Feinberg-type alternative to promote certainty. Our stock price will 
rise. Investors will see there is a plan. We are closing the circle. We 
are resolving the claims. We will get this behind us and financially 
we will move on.” GM: “Congress, we do not want a tarnished 
reputation or open litigation wounds. We want certainty, no risk. We 
will set up a program and in one year all of these cases will be gone.” 
Certainty, without the necessity of prediction. 
Understand that companies today and individual claimants are all 
interested within the confines of the civil justice system to promote 
certainty and avoid risk. So, it is all well and good. Today, I have 
talked about these very creative offline, separate channels used by 
BP, GM, and the 9/11 fund to promote certainty. What about 
everybody else? Well, within the system—the civil justice system—
companies, individuals, and lawyers are all looking for ways to 
promote certainty. Now what are some of the ways even within the 
civil justice system? I observe. I experience it as a mediator. How 
does certainty get promoted within the system? From what I have 
observed as a mediator, you have to look at certainty today, and it 
seems to me there are two ways. 
One is substantively. What does decision tree analysis show? What 
does the offer, demand, and acceptance of a specific claim show?, 
What is the formula that you use to compensate eligible claimants? 
How can we, in deciding who to pay and how much, how does that 
promote certainty? What homework do we have to do? Substantively. 
Look at our past inventory. See what we have settled and for how 
much. What have we learned from those settlements? What have we 
learned from those trials? How do we feed that substantive 
information into the future to try and make the crystal ball less 
murky? That is substantive, you see. You have to know exactly the 
nature of the claim or claims to predict the result if you do not settle. 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2001). Exxon spent $2 billion in an effort to remove the oil from the water, and $300 million on 
voluntary settlements prior to any judgments being entered against it. Id. Also, the State of Alaska and 
the United States brought actions against Exxon for the injury to the environment, which were resolved 
when Exxon agreed to pay at least $900 million to restore damages natural resources. Id. 
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What factors go into that prediction? Valuation. That is all a 
substantive discussion. Industry by industry, claim by claim. 
Important, not only for the company, but very important for the 
individual claimant represented by a lawyer who knows all about slip 
and falls, medical malpractice, mass torts, et cetera. I know seventy-
five percent of what I need to know because I have done it before. 
Now I have got to predict the other twenty-five percent. Here are the 
variables that go into it. Here are the variables that are irrelevant. I 
am trying to minimize the uncertainty for my client. 
Meanwhile, the company, substantively, is thinking about the very 
same thing. “Look, this is the ninety-third medical malpractice case 
we have received as an insurance company. We have settled or tried 
ninety-two.” Based on that wealth of information, we minimize risk, 
we predict, we know, and that is for litigations that are already in 
place, that are time honored, that are well known, substantively. Now 
another factor, in substance of course, is factoring into your analysis 
of prediction and certainty, regulatory developments—very 
important. What do the regulators say? What cases do they say are 
ripe versus immature or unsupportable? How much of the regulatory 
regime in our country is factored in? Especially by companies trying 
to minimize litigation risk. The regulatory side as a mirror, as a 
predictor of what might be in the future, now that is all substantive. 
And the reason that panelists like John Childs are on this panel and 
others like John, they have done it, they know. They know exactly 
what I’m talking about. About factoring in the past in order to 
minimize risk and predict the future. Now, it is all well and good to 
say, “Yes, that prediction we may know maybe seventy-five, eighty-
three, ninety percent accurate.” Well that is good but, of course, for 
some companies and individual claimants a ten percent risk is too 
much. It is too much. It is a science. It is very sophisticated. But that 
is all on the substantive side. 
Now, the procedural side also influences certainty and 
predictability. There are many companies in this country, contrary to 
what you may think, that welcome aggregation, Rule 23,3 
                                                                                                                 
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), any way to aggregate the claims in 
one forum, so they can get them resolved. We do not want the risk of 
the long tale—the future unknown. We want to consolidate now and 
get the claims resolved; and not only the current claims if you want 
to minimize risk. I will tell you in the civil justice system the best 
way I think the best way for a company to minimize risk going 
forward is Rule 23. We will shut down all of our current mass claims 
and we will wipe out the tail of the future by giving people ninety 
days, one hundred twenty days, to either opt out or they are in. 
Aggregation. Aggregation as a procedural tool, for a company that 
wants it, is designed first and foremost to minimize risk and promote 
certainty. 
If you go back and look at the class actions that have failed in this 
country; many of them, maybe half, have failed because plaintiff 
lawyers opposed them. We do not want that type of certainty; we do 
not want to wrap this up. Asbestos is the best example—a nightmare. 
Asbestos could have been resolved thirty years ago but the Supreme 
Court said no by a vote of seven to two.4 Justice Stevens and Justice 
Breyer got it right in their dissent. We better allow this class, because 
if we do not allow aggregation as a way to promote certainty and 
minimize risk, asbestos will remain pervasive and horrible litigation 
for the next thirty years, and that is just what happened. So 
aggregation, as a tool to promote procedural certainty—very 
important. There are other innovative ways: local and regional 
consolidation. Judge Weinstein did it years ago in Brooklyn, New 
York.5 He successfully consolidated all of the asbestos cases in 
Brooklyn and resolved them. 
But even if you cannot aggregate cases, how do you promote 
certainty and minimize “risky business”? You see companies with 
“inventory settlements.” Insurance companies do this all the time. 
Look, it is just another medical malpractice case. All we do in 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 815 (1999). 
 5. In re E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F.Supp. 1380, 1380 (E.D. N.Y. 1991); Loper v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., Nos. CV–87–1383, CV–87–1384, CV–87–2273, 1990 WL 126474, at *1 (E.D. N.Y. 
Aug. 13, 1990). 
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medical malpractice cases, we know that the litigation system, if we 
go forward, there’s a 91.3% chance that we will be found liable and 
be forced to pay $500,000. We know it. There is nine percent 
uncertainty, but we have a pretty good idea. So, quite apart from 
Feinberg’s programs, and quite apart from ongoing litigation, we will 
settle. And we will settle at a price where, based on our experience, 
we know what it is worth. It has a value. These claims are very, very 
mature. We know when they are filed what they are worth. All we 
need, to promote the type of certainty we need as businessmen—
ABC—the plaintiff lawyers also know. “Mrs. Jones you were hit by 
an automobile. Now I have thirty-four automobile cases like yours. I 
know what Chubb will pay. I know what Liberty Mutual will pay.” 
Workers’ compensation—in fifty states—is based on minimizing 
uncertainty. You lose an eye on the job, you get $3,200 a month. 
That is it. Why $3,200? “We’ve gauged these every year. We know 
what a lost eye is worth.” Well you can fight about that, but that is 
different. “$3,200 ought to be $6,800.” That is a substantive issue. I 
am talking about how, claimants and businesses alike, do not like 
“risky business.” They do not like it. It is bad for business; it is bad 
for the claimant. We want the same type of certainty that Feinberg 
provides to these companies through these programs like GM and 
BP. It is the same type. That is what we want. And what you are 
going to hear today are some variations on this discussion. What is 
the endgame? Promoting certainty. Everybody wants it. No one 
wants to roll the dice. How do you promote certainty and minimize 
risk? I know of no program quite like this symposium where you will 
talk about, even as an existential matter, certainty and minimizing 
risk. That is what it is all about you see. 
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION 
Q: Do these alternative systems undermine the precautions big 
corporations might take for safety by having this be able to resolve 
issues that come up later? Are they taking all the stuff they can to 
make the situations as safe? 
10
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A: Well you are saying, “Does the tort system deter and if you can 
go to an optional alternative system—BP, GM—does that undermine 
safety?” I do not think it undermines safety. We will see I guess. I 
think GM and BP, for all of their effort in setting up these alternative 
systems, there is plenty of other litigation to deter. If there is anything 
I have learned in this country, in this litigation system, it probably 
over deters and in these types of cases where BP sets up an 
alternative program or GM sets up an alternative program, they still 
confront thousands of other cases involving thousands of other 
automobiles or oil spills and I do not think that these programs in and 
of themselves prevent deterrence. These programs are very expensive 
by the way; I mean BP did pay $6.5 billion. Billion! So I do not think 
that the deterrence argument sits well. Especially in conjunction with 
the regulators who, after a spill and after automobile accidents, 
suddenly, are on their white horse with regulatory aggressiveness. So 
I think between that, I would think danger is not enhanced. 
Q: Is there any data or estimate about the premium that BP or GM 
paid for certainty as compared to no funds and having to deal with 
lawsuits? 
A: Far from a premium, I think, BP and GM calculated that it is 
cheaper to go this route. Not to pay law firms and not to litigate for 
twenty-two years or ten years or eight years and roll the dice with 
punitive damages and all of that risk. I think they have concluded, as 
a dollars and cents matter, our stock price and our investors would 
rather have us cabinize the problem and get rid of it quickly, rather 
than run into “risky business.” And I think, far from paying a 
premium, they see this as a very cost effective way to satisfy 
claimants and at the same time move on without uncertainty hovering 
over their shoulder. 
Q: I read recently in the newspaper that BP had appealed all the 
way to the Supreme Court, basically saying they made a bad deal and 
the court should let them out of it? 
A: That is right. After I left, I might add. After I departed in March 
of 2012, BP decided that they would settle all other private claims 
11
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pursuant to Rule 23.6 And they proceeded to sign a 1,000-page 
settlement agreement with the plaintiff lawyers. Well, after that they 
became disenchanted with that settlement, with the administration of 
that settlement, and they are now litigating in New Orleans. But I 
read the newspapers like you do. I am long gone from that. Thank 
goodness. 
Q: You indicated that in administering the funds for GM you did 
not look at contributory negligence, but rather you focused on 
proximate cause. How do you make that distinction? Because if a 
young driver is drunk, does that not lead into proximate cause? 
A: Well what we do is we isolate the young drivers drinking and 
speeding and we want to look at the mechanical problem. I mean 
somebody may be drunk and still it may be an ignition switch that is 
defective. We said the following: “We are not interested in anything 
other than the link; the causal connection between the switch and the 
accident.” If somebody is drinking or going ninety miles an hour we 
are not interested in that. We want to focus on the mechanical 
mistake. So here is what we look at to determine proximate cause. 
First, we look at the police report. If the police report says “air bags 
did not deploy,” well if the air bags did not deploy and it is a front 
end collision with a car that hit a tree going fifty miles per hour, the 
power is off or the airbags would have deployed. If the power is off, 
why is the power off? It might be the switch. 
Second, we look at the contemporaneous photos of the accident 
itself. If the airbag didn’t deploy, maybe it’s a rear end collision and 
the photos will show it and the air bags should not have deployed—if 
it is a rear end collision or a side collision. Air bag non-deployment is 
critical, but we got to look at the photos because there might be other 
reasons the air bag did not deploy. 
Third, we look at what the maintenance records show. Now the 
maintenance records before the accident will not usually mention a 
defective switch, but they may mention non-power problems. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How a Gulf Settlement That BP Once Hailed Became Its 
Target, N.Y. TIMES (April 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/us/how-a-gulf-settlement-
that-bp-once-hailed-became-its-target.html?_r=0. 
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“Maintenance guy, my car keeps stalling going fifty miles per hour, 
all of a sudden it shuts off. I pull over, but the antilock brakes do not 
work, the power steering is not functioning, and the car is stalling. I 
do not get it.” We look at that circumstantial evidence, then of course 
if you have direct evidence—the black box, the computer in the 
engine, that is great, that will tell you within a tenth of a second 
whether the power was off prior to the accident. So you look at all of 
that and then you say, this is circumstantial evidence of proximate 
cause. Ignore the kid speeding. GM found thirteen deaths based on 
direct evidence, they looked at the car; and we are already at fifty-
eight deaths based on proximate cause—a much more lenient 
standard than direct evidence. So it works. 
Q: Are you suggesting that a worker’s compensation kind of 
system would be appropriate for any type of tort claim or are there 
some kinds of tort claims that necessarily do not lend themselves to a 
worker’s compensation system? 
A: That is a policy issue. First of all understand, I am not the 
person, ever, that decides to create these programs. Governors, 
Congress, presidents, attorneys general, judges, they come to me and 
say, we have decided we want to create this program. Now you 
design it and administer it. I cannot answer the question, “Are there 
certain types of mass catastrophes where a workers compensation 
type model would not work?” I do not know. I tend to think that the 
answer to that is rather provocative. Well, they can work in any one 
of those situations. 
Now the criteria might be different, the procedures might be 
different, the proof requirements might be different, but I would tend 
to think that that in at least in a mass claims situation, thousands of 
claims, a worker’s compensation type alternative can work. I say type 
because the money certainly is not at worker’s compensation levels 
in these programs. If you are going to waive your right to sue you 
better pay people a commensurate amount that will be adequate 
consideration for them not to litigate. So you are talking about a non-
worker’s compensation damages model as to amount. I think they 
could work just about anywhere if you really wanted to set it up. The 
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trouble with setting these up more frequently is everybody else does 
not benefit. There is a certain degree of unfairness. I received claims 
during BP, “Mr. Feinberg, I could not fish in Alaska, Exxon Valdez, 
where’s my check?” Well go ask Exxon. That does not get you very 
far with that claimant. He is not happy to hear that. Go ask Exxon. I 
have no jurisdiction over Exxon. So that is the problem, not the 
design difficulty, I do not think. I think these templates work. 
Q: The law is always evolving. What kind of consequences do you 
think there are, taking all these settlements out of the courts where 
there is potential for the law to evolve—new issues, understandings 
to come about—versus we just have a settlement? 
A: There is virtually no chance that in this country we would 
encourage a comprehensive resolution of cases like this out of the 
civil justice system. And there are a couple of reasons for that. First 
of all, the people in this room I think, including the questioner, 
understand the civil justice system is so engrained in the history of 
this country. The idea that there would be some 9/11 or BP or GM 
model to replace the adversary system is tilting at windmills. The 
civil justice system, unlike any other litigation system in any other 
country, the system is part and parcel of our country’s history. It is 
engrained in the heritage of the country. It has always been there. 
And it will always be there. Secondly, even if you came up with a 
master alternative, good luck. The politics of the country is so 
antithetical to any type of major change in the way that we resolve 
disputes, I think that you would be tilting at windmills to think you 
could get very far politically with it. So I think it takes a type of 
disaster—like 9/11—where policymakers emotionally say “oh my 
goodness we need an alternative.” But, if Congress had waited two 
more weeks I do not think there would have been a 9/11 fund, at least 
not the way they drafted it. So I do not think it is realistic. I think we 
are absolutely right in this Symposium to focus on how to minimize 
risk or predict the future within the context of the civil justice system, 
not with the types of programs I administer. 
Q: In these programs, certainty is great if you are economically 
rational, but as we know people are not economically rational. Can 
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you comment on how these programs, in any way, either defeat or 
somehow help satisfy the need of the individuals to essentially be 
heard? 
A: I tell everybody that comes into these programs the statistics. 
Why? It is not just the money. It is not just financial generosity. You 
will hear from Professor Galanter and others on this, about the 
vanishing trial. If you go to court, you do not get heard. You do not 
get an opportunity to vent. In every one of my programs, GM is a 
good example, anybody who wants to come and see me, to talk about 
their claim and confront the face of the program, I will permit it. And 
if there are too many of you, I will designate a deputy to see you one-
on-one, in confidence. It works. 
Giving people the opportunity to be heard is essential to success 
and very few people come to see me to talk about money. They come 
for two reasons. One, to vent about life’s unfairness, “Mr. Feinberg, I 
lost my nineteen year old son driving a GM car. Why? Life is unfair. 
There is no God that would take my son from me.” And you just 
listen. They want to vent. Why are they the victims of a curveball? 
Why them? And they go on and on and vent. Just listen. Or, they 
come to validate the memory of a lost loved one. It is unbelievable. 
“Mr. Feinberg, I lost my husband. We were married for twenty five 
years. He was a fireman and he died in the World Trade Center, and I 
am at this hearing and I want to show you a video of our wedding 
twenty five years ago.” 
“Well, Mrs. Jones, you don’t have to show me that video, it won’t 
have any bearing on compensation and it will be very emotional.” 
“You are going to watch! I want you to see what those murderers did 
to my husband. What a great man. Look how great he looks at the 
wedding.” 
That necessity—people are not always financially and 
economically rational—of giving people the opportunity to be heard 
is important. Now many people do not want that opportunity; people 
grieve in many different ways. Some people grieve in private; they 
do not want to see you, they send in the forms, and are not interested. 
But some people want to come and see me and they want to validate, 
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and they want to vent and by giving them that opportunity, 
overwhelmingly that helps them get over the hurdle and take the 
money. And it is a critically important part of this. 
I am honored to be invited. I cannot think of a symposium that is 
more timely. I wanted to thank everybody, particularly the law school 
and particularly the law review. So thank you all very much. 
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